IME Graduiertenkolleg

IME-Logo IME Graduiertenkolleg

Graduiertenkolleg „Information Management and Market Engineering” an der Universität Karlsruhe (TH)

In der heutigen durch das Internet und den elektronischen Handel geprägten Gesellschaft sind Informationswirtschaft und Market Engineering zentrale Bestandteile des ökonomischen Alltags. Für die komplexen Aufgaben des Market Engineering – die ganzheitliche Konzeption, Realisierung, Einführung, Weiterentwicklung und Konzeption neuer Märkte oder marktähnlicher Plattformen sowie die Gestaltung ihrer rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen – ist eine zielgerichtete Vorgehensweise notwendig. Aus diesem Grund setzt sich das Graduiertenkolleg Informationswirtschaft und Market Engineering, das die drei Disziplinen Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Informatik und Rechtswissenschaften miteinander verbindet, das Ziel, in Wissenschaft, Ausbildung und Praxis problemorientiertes und interdisziplinäres Fachwissen im Bereich elektronischer Märkte zu verankern.

Derzeit sind fast zwanzig junge Wissenschaftler aus den drei Disziplinen Informatik, Wirtschaftswissenschaften und Jura als Stipendiaten im Kolleg. Jeder von Ihnen hat einen Betreuer und einen Co-Betreuer. Durch die guten Kontakte zu hervorragenden Forschungseinrichtungen und internationalen Industriepartnern bietet das Graduiertenkolleg den Kollegiaten sehr gute Möglichkeiten ihre Forschung mit Praxis zu verbinden.


Für ausführliche Informationen besuchen Sie bitte: http://www.ime.uni-karlsruhe.de
Publikationen

1
Adam, M. T. P.; Krämer, J.; Weinhardt, C. 2012–13
Excitement up! Price Down! Measuring Emotions in Dutch Auctions. International Journal of Electronic Commerce 17(2). 7–39.
doi:10.2753/JEC1086-4415170201
@Article{CitationKey,
author = {Adam, Marc T. P. and Kr\"{a}mer, Jan and Weinhardt, Christof},
title = {{Excitement up! Price Down! Measuring Emotions in Dutch Auctions}},
journal = {International Journal of Electronic Commerce},
year = {2012–13},
volume = {17},
pages = {7-39},
number = {2},
doi = {10.2753/JEC1086-4415170201},
abstract = {Recently Internet auction sites have begun to compete in emotions
by advertising the fun and excitement that bidders may experience during auction
participation. The implicit conjecture inherent in these advertisements is that
consumers derive a hedonic value from auction participation that makes exciting
auctions more attractive and possibly induces bidders to stay active longer
in the auction. We test this conjecture in a controlled economic laboratory
experiment in which we also measure bidders’ physiological arousal in terms
of heart rate and skin conductivity as proxies for their excitement during auction
participation. In particular, we conduct a series of descending price (Dutch)
auctions with different clock speeds and find that in fast Dutch auctions bidders
(i) are more excited and (ii) stay longer in the bidding process. Moreover,
the unpleasant event of losing a Dutch auction is experienced more strongly
than the rewarding event of winning. As our results show that bidders’ excitement
is directly reflected in final prices, Internet auction sites should carefully
consider how the emotions elicited on their platforms affect bidding behavior.}}

					
 
2
Adam, M. T. P.; Kroll, E. 2012
Physiological Evidence of Attraction to Chance. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics 5(3). 152–165.
doi:10.1037/a0029513
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/npe/5/3/152
@Article{CitationKey,
author = {Adam, Marc T. P. and Kroll, Eike},
title = {{Physiological Evidence of Attraction to Chance}},
journal = {Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics},
year = {2012},
volume = {5},
pages = {152-165},
number = {3},
doi = {10.1037/a0029513},
url = {http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/npe/5/3/152}}

					
 
3
Jercic, P.; Astor, P. J.; Adam, M. T. P.; Hilborn, O.; Schaaff, K.; Lindley, C.; Sennersten, C.; Eriksson, J. 2012
A serious game using physiological interfaces for emotion regulation training in the context of financial decision-making. Proceedings of the 20th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS). (Barcelona, Spain). 1–14.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2012/207/
@Inproceedings{CitationKey,
author = {Jercic, Petar and Astor, Philipp J. and Adam, Marc T. P. and Hilborn,
Olle and Schaaff, Kristina and Lindley, Craig and Sennersten, Charlotte and
Eriksson, Jeanette},
title = {{A serious game using physiological interfaces for emotion regulation
training in the context of financial decision-making}},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 20th European Conference on Information Systems
(ECIS)},
year = {2012},
address = {Barcelona, Spain},
pages = {1-14},
url = {http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2012/207/}}

					
 
4
Adam, M. T. P.; Krämer, J.; Jähnig, C.; Seifert, S.; Weinhardt, C. 2011
Understanding Auction Fever: A Framework for Emotional Bidding. Electronic Markets 21(3). 197–207.
doi:10.1007/s12525-011-0068-9
@Article{CitationKey,
author = {Adam, Marc T. P. and Kr\"{a}mer, Jan and J\"{a}hnig, Caroline and
Seifert, Stefan and Weinhardt, Christof},
title = {{Understanding Auction Fever: A Framework for Emotional Bidding}},
journal = {Electronic Markets},
year = {2011},
volume = {21},
pages = {197-207},
number = {3},
doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12525-011-0068-9},
abstract = {Auction fever is a multifaceted phenomenon that is frequently observed
in both traditional and Internet auctions. In order to gain a better understanding
of its causes, we develop a conceptual framework to analyze emotions in auctions,
which is based on an exhaustive literature review. The framework integrates
rational calculus with emotional aspects and suggests that emotional processing
is triggered at three different stages of an auction: First, the economic
environment can affect a bidder’s level of perceived competition and thus
influence the bidding strategy prior to the auction. Second, auction events
may have ramifications on the bidder's emotional state during the auction due
to previous investments or perceived ownership. Third, past auction outcomes
may impact future bidding behavior through emotions such as the joy of winning
or loser regret. Auction fever, eventually, is a phenomenon that results from
the interplay of these emotional processes and causes a bidder to deviate from
an initially chosen bidding strategy.}}

					
 
5
Adam, M. T. P.; Gamer, M.; Krämer, J.; Weinhardt, C. 2011
Measuring Emotions in Electronic Markets. Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS). (Shanghai, China). Association for Information Systems. ISBN 978-0-615-55907-0. 1–19.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2011/proceedings/breakthroughideas/1
@Inproceedings{CitationKey,
author = {Adam, Marc T. P. and Gamer, Matthias and Kr\"{a}mer, Jan and Weinhardt,
Christof},
title = {{Measuring Emotions in Electronic Markets}},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems
(ICIS)},
year = {2011},
address = {Shanghai, China},
pages = {1-19},
publisher = {Association for Information Systems},
note = {ISBN 978-0-615-55907-0},
url = {http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis2011/proceedings/breakthroughideas/1}}

					
 
6
Astor, P. J.; Adam, M. T. P.; Jähnig, C.; Seifert, S. 2011
Measuring Regret: Emotional Aspects of Auction Design. Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS). (Helsinki, Finland). 1129–1140.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2011/88
@Inproceedings{CitationKey,
author = {Astor, Philipp J. and Adam, Marc T. P. and J\"{a}hnig, Caroline and
Seifert, Stefan},
title = {{Measuring Regret: Emotional Aspects of Auction Design}},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 19th European Conference on Information Systems
(ECIS)},
year = {2011},
address = {Helsinki, Finland},
pages = {1129-1140},
url = {http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2011/88}}

					
 
7
Adam, M. T. P.; Krämer, J.; Weinhardt, C.; Ehrhart, K.-M. 2010
Investigating Auction Fever. in: Dreier, T.; Krämer, J.; Studer, R.; Weinhardt, C. (eds.), Information Management and Market Engineering: Vol. II Studies on eOrganisation and Market Engineering. Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing. 141–157. ISBN: 978-3-86644-589-5.
@Misc{CitationKey,
author = {Adam, M. T. P.; Kr\"{a}mer, Jan; Weinhardt, Christof; Ehrhart,
Karl-Martin},
title = {{Investigating Auction Fever}},
howpublished = {in: Dreier, T.; Kr\"{a}mer, J.; Studer, R.; Weinhardt, C. (eds.),
Information Management and Market Engineering: Vol. II Studies on eOrganisation
and Market Engineering. Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing. 141–157},
year = {2010},
note = {ISBN: 978-3-86644-589-5}}

					
 
8
Dreier, T.; Krämer, J.; Studer, R.; Weinhardt, C. (eds.). 2010
Information Management and Market Engineering: Vol. II. Studies on eOrganisation and Market Engineering. No. 11. Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing. 260 p., ISBN: 978-3-86644-589-5.
http://www.amazon.de/dp/386644589X
@Proceedings{CitationKey,
title = {{Information Management and Market Engineering: Vol. II}},
year = {2010},
editor = {Dreier, Thomas and Kr\"{a}mer, Jan and Studer, Rudi and Weinhardt,
Christof},
number = {11},
series = {Studies on eOrganisation and Market Engineering},
address = {Karlsruhe},
publisher = {KIT Scientific Publishing},
note = {260 p., ISBN: 978-3-86644-589-5},
url = {http://www.amazon.de/dp/386644589X},
abstract = {The research program "Information Management and Market Engineering"
focuses on the analysis and the design of electronic markets. Taking a holistic
view of the conceptualization and realization of solutions, the research
integrates the disciplines business administration, economics, computer science,
and law. Topics of interest range from the implementation, quality assurance,
and further development of electronic markets to their integration into business
processes, innovative business models, and legal frameworks.



This second volume not only collects the advancements of the Graduate School
"Information Management and Market Engineering" at the Karlsruhe Institute of
Technology, which is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German
Research Foundation), since the first volume of this book, but also points at
new research fields that have recently been explored.}}

					
 
9
Wiewiorra, L.; Krämer, J.; Weinhardt, C.; Ehrhart, K.-M. 2010
Consumer Perception of Time Based Pricing. in: Dreier, T.; Krämer, J.; Studer, R.; Weinhardt, C. (eds.), Information Management and Market Engineering: Vol. II. Studies on eOrganisation and Market Engineering. Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing. 179—190. ISBN: 978-3-86644-589-5.
@Misc{CitationKey,
author = {Wiewiorra, Lukas and Kr\"{a}mer, Jan and Weinhardt, Christof and
Ehrhart, Karl-Martin},
title = {{Consumer Perception of Time Based Pricing}},
howpublished = {in: Dreier, T.; Kr\"{a}mer, J.; Studer, R.; Weinhardt, C. (eds.),
Information Management and Market Engineering: Vol. II. Studies on eOrganisation
and Market Engineering. Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing. 179—190. ISBN:
978-3-86644-589-5},
year = {2010}}

					
 
10
Adam, M. T. P. 2010
Measuring Emotions in Electronic Auctions. Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing.
http://digbib.ubka.uni-karlsruhe.de/volltexte/1000018894
@Book{CitationKey,
title = {{Measuring Emotions in Electronic Auctions}},
publisher = {KIT Scientific Publishing},
year = {2010},
author = {Marc T. P. Adam},
address = {Karlsruhe},
url = {http://digbib.ubka.uni-karlsruhe.de/volltexte/1000018894},
abstract = {Auctions are nowadays a popular and frequently employed market
mechanism in electronic markets. In economic literature, the success of electronic
auctions has been largely attributed to the reduction of transaction costs,
the large number of potential buyers, and the independence of time and space.
However, an additional explanation for the success of electronic markets, and
in particular Internet consumer auctions, is the hedonic or emotional value
bidders derive from auction participation. The emotionality bidders experience
in Internet auctions confronts a market engineer of electronic markets with
two important challenges, regarding both the auction mechanism design and the
user interface design. First, how can an auction system induce emotionality
and, thus, attract excitement oriented consumers? Second, what is the impact
of emotionality on bidding behavior? In order to approach both challenges, a
market engineer needs to be able to actually measure emotions in electronic
auctions. This thesis develops a structured methodology that allows to
systematically analyze emotions in electronic auctions. It provides a unified
framework for emotional bidding in electronic auctions, which comprises the
bidders' processes of cognitive reasoning and emotional processing. Moreover,
a methodology for measuring physiological correlates of human emotional processing
in economic experiments is proposed: physioeconomics. Physioeconomics extends
existing methods of experimental economics by measuring autonomic nervous system
activity using well-established psychophysiological methodology in order to
gain a profound understanding of human economic decision-making. Based on the
framework for emotional bidding and the methodology of physioeconomics, this
thesis describes how emotions and their impact can be measured in electronic
ascending auctions, and provides a proof-of-concept study. Moreover, an experiment
was conducted in order to analyze the impact of clock speeds on the bidders'
emotional processing and behavior in Dutch auctions. Several previous experimental
studies have discovered that the sellers' revenues in Dutch auctions depend
on the speed at which the standing price is decreased: Slow Dutch auctions
generally yield higher revenues than fast Dutch auctions. This effect is commonly
explained by the conjecture that participants experience a ``utility of suspense''
which is stronger in fast Dutch auctions. The experiment in this thesis provides
physiological evidence for a utility of suspense in Dutch auctions, further
characterizes the elicited emotional state bidders experience, and investigates
how this emotional state is reflected in bidding behavior. Furthermore,
characteristic patterns of bidders' emotional processing in Dutch auctions are
identified. It is shown (1) that inducing a bidder with an independent private
valuation directly influences her level of arousal, and (2) that the heart rate
of the winning bidder momentarily decreases about two seconds before she places
her bid.}}

					
 
11
Krämer, J.; Wiewiorra, L. 2010
Consumer Perception of Mobile Telephony Tariffs with Cost Caps. Proceedings of 9th Conference on Telecommunications, Internet and Media Techno Economics (CTTE). (Ghent, Belgium). IEEE. ISBN 978-1-4244-7988-7. 1–8.
doi:10.1109/ctte.2010.5557703
@Inproceedings{CitationKey,
author = {Kr\"{a}mer, Jan; Wiewiorra, Lukas},
title = {{Consumer Perception of Mobile Telephony Tariffs with Cost Caps}},
booktitle = {Proceedings of 9th Conference on Telecommunications, Internet and
Media Techno Economics (CTTE)},
year = {2010},
address = {Ghent, Belgium},
pages = {1-8},
publisher = {IEEE},
note = {ISBN 978-1-4244-7988-7},
doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CTTE.2010.5557703},
abstract = {In this article we provide a seminal academic investigation of mobile
telephony consumers' perception of the recently introduced cost cap tariff in
comparison to corresponding pay-per-use and flatrate calling plans. Previous
studies have identified several psychological effects through which consumers
are believed to be biased towards flatrate plans. However, flatrate plans also
limit customers' tariff flexibility in months of low usage. Cost cap tariffs
are a hybrid between pay-per-use and flatrate plans and can offer cost insurance
while maintaining flexibility. In particular, we provide evidence from a survey
among 214 German university students that flexibility, cost insurance and the
so-called taximeter effect are the main drivers behind cost cap tariff choice.
Furthermore, we show that the insurance and taximeter effects are distinct if
evaluated within a flatrate or cost cap tariff framework. Finally, based on
our results we also comment on the profitability of cost cap plans from a
strategic management perspective.}}

					
 
12
Krämer, J.; Wiewiorra, L. 2010
Innovation through Discrimination!? - A Formal Analysis of the Net Neutrality Debate. The 8th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC). (Vancouver, Canada).
@Conference{CitationKey,
author = {Kr\"{a}mer, Jan; Wiewiorra, Lukas},
title = {{Innovation through Discrimination!? - A Formal Analysis of the Net
Neutrality Debate}},
booktitle = {The 8th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference
(IIOC)},
year = {2010},
address = {Vancouver, Canada},
month = {May}}

					
 
13
Adam, M. T. P.; Krämer, J.; Weinhardt, C. 2009
A Theory of Bid Protraction: Evidence from a Physioeconomic Experiment. Tagung der Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung. (Essen, Germany).
@Conference{CitationKey,
author = {Adam, M. T. P. and Kr\"{a}mer, Jan and Weinhardt, Christof},
title = {{A Theory of Bid Protraction: Evidence from a Physioeconomic
Experiment}},
booktitle = {Tagung der Gesellschaft f\"{u}r experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung},
year = {2009},
address = {Essen, Germany},
abstract = {Several previous experimental studies have discovered that seller's
revenue in Dutch auctions depends on the speed at which the standing price is
decreased: Slow Dutch auctions generally yield higher seller’s revenues than
fast Dutch auctions. This effect is commonly explained by the fact that auction
participants experience a “utility of suspense”, which last longer in slow Dutch
auctions, such that bidder’s are willing to accept higher prices there. In a
physioeconomic experiment, we show to the contrary that fast Dutch auctions
are more exciting to bidders. Furthermore, we provide physiological evidence
for an alternative explanation of the observed price differentials in Dutch
auctions with different clock speeds: Although bidders have in principle similar
perceptions about the price at which they intend to stop the clock in both
treatments, they refrain from bidding 2-3 seconds longer before they actually
stop the clock. This grace period is invariant of the clock-speed! However,
in this amount of time the standing price has decreased more at faster clock
speeds, which accurately explains the difference in final prices.}}

					
 
14
Krämer, J. 2009
Bundling Vertically Differentiated Communications Services to Leverage Market Power. info: The journal for policy, regulation and strategy for telecommunications, Information and Media 11(3). 64–74.
doi:10.1108/14636690910954980
@Article{CitationKey,
author = {Kr\"{a}mer, Jan},
title = {{Bundling Vertically Differentiated Communications Services to Leverage
Market Power}},
journal = {info: The journal for policy, regulation and strategy for
telecommunications, Information and Media},
year = {2009},
volume = {11},
pages = {64-74},
number = {3},
month = {May},
doi = {10.1108/14636690910954980},
abstract = {Purpose – Despite Digital Convergence, in many countries the former
telco monopolist remains to hold significant market power in its home market
for telecommunication services. I investigate whether and how bundling services
may achieve leverage of market power from the telco's home to a secondary service
market (e.g. video broadcasting).



Design/methodology/approach – To this extend I consider a formal game-theoretic
model where the telco firm holds a monopoly in the market for telecommunications
services, while competing with a cable firm in the market for video broadcasting
services. Services may differ in quality. For the firms, the provision of
high-quality services is more costly than the provision of low-quality services.
Conversely, consumers have a greater reservation price for higher service
qualities. Therefore firms face a trade off between revenues and cost when
selecting the optimal service quality.



Findings – The model shows that the telco firm can achieve market power leverage
by bundling its services, which therefore is more profitable than offering each
service separately. In particular, the quality leverage mechanism is highlighted,
which reveals that bundling alters the optimal service quality choice of the
competitors favorably.



Research limitations/implications – Like every game-theoretic model, the present
model rests on formal assumptions representing stylized facts. Future research
should try back these by empirical evidence. 



Practical implications – The paper reveals how bundling may be employed as a
strategic weapon in order to increase profits in the converging communications
market.



Originality/value – The paper shows that bundling communications services can
not only have significant ramifications for the quality of these services, but
also for the competition in industry.



Keywords: Telecommunications Industry, Digital Communications Systems, Competitive
Strategy, Pricing, Services, Game-Theory}}

					
 
15
Lamparter, S.; Luckner, S.; Mutschler, S. 2008
Semi-Automated Management of Web Service Contracts. International Journal of Services Sciences 1(3/4).
@Article{CitationKey,
author = {Lamparter, S. and Luckner, S. and Mutschler, S.},
title = {{Semi-Automated Management of Web Service Contracts}},
journal = {International Journal of Services Sciences},
year = {2008},
volume = {1},
number = {3/4},
abstract = {Service-oriented computing as a concept for providing interoperability
and flexibility within heterogeneous environments has gained much attention
within the last few years. Dynamically integrating externalWeb services into
enterprise applications requires automatic contracting between service requestors
and providers and automatic contract monitoring. This paper suggests a
semi-automatic approach since in the current legal environment full automation
is not feasible. We elaborate on the content of Web service contracts from a
legal perspective and derive a set of legal requirements. Based on these
requirements we propose an ontology-based representation of contract clauses
as well as monitoring information. We can thus automatically evaluate whether
a service execution meets the requirements expressed in a contract.}}

					
 
16
Krämer, J. 2007
Digital Convergence, Pricing Strategies and Firms' Profits in the Telecommunication and Entertainment Media Industry. Proceedings of the 6th Conference on Telecommunication Techno-Economics. (Helsinki, Finland, 14-15 June 2007). IEEE. ISBN 978-1-4244-1233-4. 1–8.
doi:10.1109/CTTE.2007.4389896
@Inproceedings{CitationKey,
author = {Kr\"{a}mer, Jan},
title = {{Digital Convergence, Pricing Strategies and Firms' Profits in the
Telecommunication and Entertainment Media Industry}},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th Conference on Telecommunication
Techno-Economics},
year = {2007},
address = {Helsinki, Finland, 14-15 June 2007},
pages = {1-8},
publisher = {IEEE},
note = {ISBN 978-1-4244-1233-4},
doi = {10.1109/CTTE.2007.4389896},
abstract = {Digital convergence of telecommunication and entertainment media
services drove former network monopolists into a prisoner's dilemma forcing
them to enter each others markets. In this reciprocal duopoly firms now offer
their services in a bundle, commonly known as triple play. I investigate whether
bundling is indeed a profitable pricing strategy for these services and if it
can facilitate market power leverage. I will show that bundle pricing serves
as a powerful leverage device for one firm in this industry. This is achieved
through a quality sorting effect accruing as the firms wish to shield themselves
from increased price competition in the market for bundles. Thereby, one firm
emerges as the high-quality, high-profit provider in both markets, whereas the
competing firm has to settle for low qualities and profits.}}

					
 
17
Krämer, J.; Berninghaus, S.; Weinhardt, C. 2006
Competing on Many Fronts: Entry Networks in an Economy of Multi-Product Firms. in: Dreier, T.; Studer, R.; Weinhardt, C. (eds.), Information Management and Market Engineering. Universitätsverlag Karlsruhe. 139–151.
Available at: click here
@Misc{CitationKey,
author = {Kr\"{a}mer, Jan and Berninghaus, Siegfried and Weinhardt, Christof},
title = {{Competing on Many Fronts: Entry Networks in an Economy of Multi-Product
Firms}},
howpublished = {in: Dreier, T.; Studer, R.; Weinhardt, C. (eds.), Information
Management and Market Engineering. Universit\"{a}tsverlag Karlsruhe. 139–151},
year = {2006},
url =
{http://www.amazon.de/Information-Management-Market-Engineering-Thomas/dp/3866440596/}}

					
KIT – University of the State of Baden-Wuerttemberg and National Research Center of the Helmholtz Association